Information-Theoretic Security or Covert Communication by Forouzesh, Moslem et al.
1Information-Theoretic Security or Covert
Communication
Moslem Forouzesh, Paeiz Azmi, Senior Member, IEEE, Nader Mokari, Senior
Member, IEEE, Kai Kit Wong, Fellow, IEEE and Dennis Goeckel, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract
Information-theoretic secrecy, in particular the wiretap channel formulation, provides protection
against interception of a message by adversary Eve and has been widely studied in the last two decades.
In contrast, covert communications under an analogous formulation provides protection against even the
detection of the presence of the message by an adversary, and it has drawn significant interest recently.
These two security topics are generally applicable in different scenarios; however, here we explore
what can be learned by studying them under a common framework. Under a similar but not identical
mathematical formulation, we introduce power optimization problems for each of the secrecy and the
covert communications scenario, and we exploit common aspects of the problems to employ similar tools
in their respective optimizations. Moreover, due to the practical limitations, we assume only channel
distribution information (CDI) are available for the secrecy and the covert communications scenarios.
We then provide extensive numerical results to consider the performance of each of the schemes to
understand the performance of each approach for various system parameters. These results can be used,
for example, to understand the difference in achievable rate that would be entailed in adopting a more
restrictive covert communications approach rather than standard information-theoretic secrecy.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Security is a major challenge in communication networks, and wireless communications links
can make security even more challenging due to their broadcast nature. Cryptographic security
is the current state-of-the-art in practice, but, in recent years, information-theoretic security
obtained by exploiting the physical layer has garnered a lot of attention, often employing the
wiretap model introduced by Wyner [1]. In his pioneering work, Wyner demonstrated that if an
eavesdropper’s channel is a degraded version of the legitimate user’s channel, then the legitimate
user can achieve a positive information rate - known as the secrecy rate - at which the content
of the message is kept confidential from the eavesdropper.
More recently, there has been great interest in understanding the fundamental performance
limits of techniques which aim to hide the existence of a communication from an observer; this
has been termed “covert” communications. The modern study of the limits of covert commu-
nications was initiated in [2] and then addressed independently in [3], [4] for additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels; these studies motivated significant further study [5] [6], [7]
to rapidly characterize the performance of covert communications over discrete memoryless
channels (DMCs) and AWGN channels. In [8], the authors study the capability of a source to
transmit covertly and reliably to a destination with the help of a jammer in the presence of the
adversary.
Critical to the security performance of a system is the knowledge at various participants about
the characteristics of the multipath fading environment: both the distribution of the channel
fading, which we will term the channel distribution information (CDI), and the current instan-
tiation of the channel fading, which is termed the channel state information (CSI). There is
a significant amount of work in information-theoretic secrecy done under the assumption of
uncertain channel state information (CSI), while recently covert communication with uncertain
CSI has been investigated in [9] and [10]. A primary reason for this assumption is that both
Eve and Bob are normally assumed to be passive and, if Bob feeds back the estimate of the
channel between Alice and himself, Eve can damage this feedback signal by artificial noise,
which leads to low performance [11] [12]. While recent work in information-theoretic secrecy
and covert communications has studied system design and performance under uncertain CDI in
[13] and [14], respectively, the standard is to assume perfect CDI as in [15]- [19] and [20], [21],
respectively. Indeed, in this paper, we assume that the CDI of the multipath fading channels is
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3available to Alice, but we assume that the CSI of the channels from Alice to the eavesdropper
(Eve) and Alice to the intended receiver (Bob) are unknown at the transmitter (Alice).
Information-theoretic security and covert communications are generally studied separately,
because they have different goals and thus a selection is generally made based on the requirements
of the application. However, here we explore these two techniques together for two reasons: (i)
Analytical: There might be commonalities in the optimization problems presented that allow
us to employ similar techniques; and (ii) Application: It might be of interest to understand the
cost of hiding the existence of the message (covert communications) rather than just its content
(information-theoretic secrecy) in a given scenario. The system architecture considered will have
the parties from the basic wiretap channel, with transmitter Alice, receiver Bob, and adversary
Eve, but also with a jammer to (possibly) aid in secret or covert communication. We will refer
to this architecture as the wiretap channel throughout, with an understanding that a jammer has
been added and that the adversary Eve in the covert case has a different goal than deciphering
the message1.
This paper makes the following significant contributions:
1) For the considered wiretap channel architecture, the power allocations for maximizing the
secrecy rate and covert rate are addressed:
• To solve the optimization problem in the case of information-theoretic security, we
first find a tight lower bound of the ergodic secrecy rate; then, we adopt the Successive
Convex Approximation (SCA) method to maximize it.
• In order to solve the optimization problem for the covert communications scenario, we
first find a tight lower bound of the ergodic covert rate; then, we employ an auxiliary
variable to maximize it.
• We show that the lower bounds of ergodic secrecy rate and covert rate are tight.
2) We obtain a closed-form optimal power threshold for Eve in the covert communication
application.
3) We present numerical results demonstrating the performance of the two techniques for
various operating conditions.
1Because the goal is different in the covert communications scenario, the adversary is often termed warden Willie, but we
will use Eve as the adversary here in both scenarios.
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4The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We present the system model in Section II. The
optimization problems are developed for information-theoretic security and covert communica-
tion in Sections III and IV, respectively. In Section V, the solutions to the optimization problems
are investigated. We provide numerical results and discussions in Section VI. Finally, Section
VII presents our conclusions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The precise system model under consideration for each of the information-theoretic and covert
communications scenarios will be given in successive sections; here, we give aspects that are
common to both systems. The model consists of Alice, Bob, a jammer, and one Eve. Alice aims
to send a private message to Bob, and the jammer broadcasts a jamming signal to help Alice.
The distance from Alice to Bob, Alice to Eve, jammer to Bob, and that from jammer to Eve
are denoted by dab, dae, djb, and dje, respectively. Moreover, we denote the channel coefficients
between Alice and Bob, Alice and Eve, jammer and Bob, and between jammer and Eve as hab,
hae, hjb, and hje, respectively. Per the previous section, we assume that channel distribution
information (CDI) but not channel state information (CSI) is available to Alice.
The channel coefficients are assumed to be circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random
variables with zero mean and unit variance. We consider a discrete-time channel with Q time
slots, each with a length of n symbols. The data signal transmitted by Alice and the jamming
signal transmitted by the jammer in each time slot can be written as xb = [x1b , x
2
b , . . . , x
n
b ]
and xj =
[
x1j , x
2
j , . . . , x
n
j
]
, respectively. As motivated by the work in [8], we assume Gaussian
codebooks and a Gaussian jamming signal; hence, each of xb and xj is a vector of independently
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian random variables with zero mean and unit variance.
Information-theoretic security and covert communication methods have different requirements,
assumptions, and applications, which we review here before proceeding to the formal problem
formulations in the next section.
1) Information-Theoretic Security:
• Assumptions:
a) Since Alice is known to be active, Eve is assumed to know the instantaneous values
of the channel (CSI), having estimated such from prior observations.
b) Eve knows the codebook used by the data transmitter (Alice) and legitimate receiver
(Bob).
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5• Application: Prevent Eve from extracting information of the private message; in other
words, in this method, avoiding detection of the communication by Eve is not necessary
while avoiding information access by Eve is very important and should be guaranteed.
2) Covert Communication:
• Assumptions:
a) Since Alice is no known to be active, Eve does not have CSI but has knowledge
of the distribution of the channel (CDI).
b) Eve does not know the codebook used by Alice and Bob.
• Application: Prevent Eve from detecting the presence of the communication.
III. INFORMATION-THEORETIC SECURITY
The received signal at receiver m (Bob or Eve) is given by
ym =
√
(1− ρ)Pthjmxj
d
α/2
jm
+
√
ρPthamxb
d
α/2
am
+ ηm, (1)
where ρ and Pt are the power allocation factor and total transmit power, respectively. Hence,
(1− ρ)Pt and ρPt are the allocated power for the jamming signal and the transmission of
Alice’s message to Bob, respectively, α denotes the path-loss exponent, and ηm ∼ CN (0, σ2mIn)
represents the received noise vector at user m. Moreover, In is the n × n identity matrix, 0 is
an n × 1 zero vector, and σ2m is the variance of the noise at a given receiver. Following [22]
and [23], we assume Bob has knowledge of the predefined jamming signal and is able to cancel
it. As a consequence, the signal-to-interference plus noise ratio (SINR) at Eve and Bob can be
expressed as
SINRe =
ρPt|hae|2d−αae
(1− ρ)Pt|hje|2d−αje + σ2e
, SINRb =
ρPt|hab|2
dαabσ
2
b
, (2)
respectively. Therefore, the instantaneous secrecy rate at Bob can be written as [24]:
Rsec (ρ) = [log2 (1 + SINRb)− log2 (1 + SINRe)]+, (3)
where [x]+ is defined as max {x, 0}.
July 17, 2019 DRAFT
6Fig. 1: System model.
A. Optimization Problem
The system aims to maximize the average secrecy rate at Bob subject to a transmit power
constraint Pt. Hence, the optimization problem is formulated as follows:
max
ρ
E
{
[log2 (1 + SINRb)− log2 (1 + SINRe)]+
}
(4a)
s.t. 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, (4b)
where E {.} is the expectation operator.
IV. COVERT COMMUNICATION
For the case of covert communication, Alice may be transmitting or she may not be, so there
is a received signal model for each scenario. In particular, the received signal at receiver m (Bob
or Eve) is
ym =

√
(1−ρ)Pthjmxj
d
α/2
jm
+ ηm, Ψ0
√
ρPthamxb
d
α/2
am
+
√
(1−ρ)Pthjmxj
d
α/2
jm
+ ηm, Ψ1,
(5)
where Ψ0 specifies the case where Alice does not transmit any message to Bob, while Ψ1 states
that Alice transmits a message to Bob.
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7Because Eve’s CSI in unknown at Alice and the distribution of the multipath fading and noise
are independent, the conditional distribution of each symbol of the received signal at Eve given
hae and hje follows ym|hae, hje ∼ CN (0, σ2e + λ), where λ is a random variable which can be
written as
λ =

(1−ρ)Pt
dαje
|hje|2, Ψ0
ρPt
dαae
|hae|2 + (1−ρ)Ptdαje |hje|
2, Ψ1,
(6)
Since hae and hje are circularly symmetric complex Gaussian with zero mean and unit variance
and they are independent, the distribution of λ is
fΛΨ (λ) =

1
(1−ρ)Ptd−αje
e
− λd
α
je
(1−ρ)Pt , Ψ0
1
Pt(ρd−αae −(1−ρ)d−αje )
[
e
− λ
ρPtd
−α
ae − e
− λ
(1−ρ)Ptd−αje
]
, Ψ1.
(7)
The SINR at Bob is given by
SINRb =
 0, Ψ0ρPt|hab|2
dαabσ
2
b
, Ψ1.
(8)
When Eve mistakenly decides Ψ1 while Ψ0 is true, a false alarm (FA) with probability PFA
occurs. Moreover, if Eve decides Ψ0 while Ψ1 is true, a missed detection (MD) with probability
PMD occurs. Alice and Bob achieve covert communication when, for ε > 0 [4]:
PMD + PFA ≥ 1− ε, as n→∞. (9)
We assume the decision rule at Willie is the standard power detector, Ye
n
Ψ1
≷
Ψ0
ϑ, that Willie is
likely to employ in practice [8], [9], [25]. Moreover, Ye =
n∑`
=1
∣∣y`e∣∣2 is defined as the total power
received by Eve in a given time slot, and ϑ is the threshold for the decision at Eve. Conditioned
on λ, the FA and MD probabilities are given by [9]
PFA(λ) = P
(
Ye
n
> ϑ |λ,Ψ0
)
= P
((
σ2e + λ
) χ22n
n
> ϑ |λ,Ψ0
)
, (10)
PMD(λ) = P
(
Ye
n
< ϑ |λ,Ψ1
)
= P
((
σ2e + λ
) χ22n
n
< ϑ |λ,Ψ1
)
, (11)
where χ22n is a random variable with chi-squared distribution with 2n degrees of freedom. Much
of the recent work in covert communications [4] [5] [6], [7] has focused on performance of the
covert communications system as a function of the codeword length n. However, in analogy
to the insight provided by the outage approach to standard wireless communications, a number
of authors have recently considered letting n → ∞ and then considering the probability that
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8channel conditions occur such that covert communications is achieved [9] [14] [26]. Here, we
also take such an “outage” approach.
According to the strong law of large numbers (SLLN), χ
2
2n
n
converges to 1, and, based on
Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem [27], we can rewrite (10) and (11) as:
PFA(λ) = P
(
σ2e + λ > ϑ |λ,Ψ0
)
=
 1, λ > ϑ− σ2e0, else (12)
PMD(λ) = P
(
σ2e + λ < ϑ |λ,Ψ1
)
=
 1, λ < ϑ− σ2e0, else (13)
Employing the distribution of λ from (7) yields the unconditioned probability of false alarm
and missed detection, respectively, as:
PFA =
∫ ∞
ϑ−σ2e
1
(1− ρ)Ptd−αje
e
− λd
α
je
(1−ρ)Pt dλ =
 e
−(ϑ−σ2e)
(1−ρ)Ptd−αje ,
ϑ− σ2e ≥ 0
1, ϑ− σ2e < 0,
(14)
and
PMD =
∫ ϑ−σ2e
0
[
e
− λ
ρPtd
−α
ae − e
− λ
(1−ρ)Ptd−αje
]
Pt
(
ρd−αae − (1− ρ) d−αje
) dλ =

1 +
(1−ρ)d−αje e
− (
ϑ−σ2e)
(1−ρ)Ptd−αje −ρd−αae e
−(
ϑ−σ2e)
ρPtd
−α
ae

ρd−αae −(1−ρ)d−αje
, ϑ− σ2e ≥ 0
0, ϑ− σ2e < 0.
(15)
Combining (14) and (15) yields:
PFA + PMD =

1 + e
−(ϑ−σ2e)
(1−ρ)Ptd−αje + U
ρd−αae −(1−ρ)d−αje
, ϑ− σ2e ≥ 0
1, ϑ− σ2e < 0.
(16)
where U =
(1− ρ) d−αje e− (ϑ−σ
2
e)
(1−ρ)Ptd−αje − ρd−αae e
−(
ϑ−σ2e)
ρPtd
−α
ae
.
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9A. Optimal Threshold for Eve
Eve will select a decoding threshold that minimizes PFA + PMD. If ϑ ≤ σ2e , Eve will always
declare that Alice is transmitting regardless of the observation, and, hence, not surprisingly, we
note from (16) that PFA + PMD = 1. Hence, Eve will select a ϑ such that ϑ > σ2e , meaning
that we can find the optimal ϑ using the first line in (16). It is shown in Appendix B that the
optimal ϑ is given by
ϑ∗ =
(
ρPtd
−α
ae (1− ρ)Ptd−αje
(1− ρ)Ptd−αje − ρPtd−αae
)
ln
(
(1− ρ)Ptd−αje
ρPtd−αae
)
+ σ2e . (17)
B. Optimization Problem
Our goal is to maximize the covert rate from Alice to Bob subject to the transmit power
constraint and the covert communication condition, i.e., (9) is satisfied. Hence, we consider the
following optimization problem:
max
ρ
Pψ1E
{
log2
(
1 +
ρPt|hab|2
dαabσ
2
b
)}
, (18a)
s.t. (4b)
min
ϑ
(PFA + PMD) > 1− ε. (18b)
where Pψ1 it the probability that Alice transmits. For solving (18), we first solve min
ϑ
PFA+PMD
to obtain the optimal ϑ, denoted by ϑ∗, for Eve. Then we solve (18) based on ϑ∗.
V. SOLUTIONS TO THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS
Problems (4) and (18) are nonconvex: in (4), the objective function is not concave, and, in
(18), constraint (18b) is not convex. In the following, we propose novel algorithms to solve these
optimization problems.
A. The Information-Theoretic Security Case
Per (3), the instantaneous secrecy rate is
Rsec (ρ) =
[
log2
(
1 + SINRb
1 + SINRe
)]+
. (19)
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We know that log2
(
1+SINRb
1+SINRe
)
≤
[
log2
(
1+SINRb
1+SINRe
)]+
, hence, E
{
log2
(
1+SINRb
1+SINRe
)}
≤ E{[
log2
(
1+SINRb
1+SINRe
)]+}
. In order to simplify the formulation and solve the corresponding opti-
mization problem, we maximize E
{
log2
(
1+SINRb
1+SINRe
)}
instead of E
{[
log2
(
1+SINRb
1+SINRe
)]+}
; then,
we show that the maximization of this lower bound is very tight by numerical results. By
exploiting this lower bound, the optimization problem (4) is reformulated as:
E {Rsec (ρ)} ≥ E
{
− log2
(
1 +
ρPt|hae|2d−αae
(1− ρ)Pt|hje|2d−αje + σ2e
)
+ log2
(
1 +
ρPt|hab|2
dαabσ
2
b
)}
= 1
ln 2
E
{
ln
(
1 +
ρPte
ln(|hab|2)
dαabσ
2
b
)}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
− E{ln (σ2e + (1− ρ)Ptd−αje |hje|2 + ρPtd−αae |hae|2)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
+ E
{
ln
(
σ2e + (1− ρ)Ptd−αje eln(|hje|
2)
)}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
 .
(20)
In the following, we again will find a lower bound, this time of (20), and then maximize
this lower bound. The numerical results will again illustrate that this lower bound is near to the
ergodic secrecy rate. We will lower bound A in (20) as
A =E
{
ln
(
1 +
ρPte
ln(|hab|2)
dαabσ
2
b
)}
(a)
≥ ln
(
1 +
ρPte
E{ln(|hab|2)}
dαabσ
2
b
)
. (21)
Moreover, B can be upper bounded by
B = E
{
ln
(
σ2e + (1− ρ)Ptd−αje |hje|2 + ρPtd−αae |hae|2
)}
(b)
≤ ln (σ2e + (1− ρ)Ptd−αje E{|hje|2}+ ρPtd−αae E{|hae|2}) , (22)
and C can be lower bounded by
C =E
{
ln
(
σ2e + (1− ρ)Ptd−αje eln(|hje|
2)
)} (c)
≥ ln
(
σ2e + (1− ρ)Ptd−αje eE{ln(|hje|
2)}) , (23)
In (21), (22), and (23), (a), (b), and (c) are obtained from Jensens inequality. Note that the
functions ln (1 + sex) and ln (1 + dx) are convex for s > 0 and concave for d ∈ R, respectively,
where R is the set of real numbers.
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Next, our aim is to calculate E
{
ln
(|hab|2)} and E{ln (|hje|2)}. First:
E
{
ln
(|hab|2)} = ∞∫
0
ln (x)f|hab|2(x)dx =
∞∫
0
ln (x)e−xdx
=
{
Ei (−x)− e−x ln (x)} |∞0 = − ∞∑
k=1
(
1
k
− ln
(
k + 1
k
))
= −γ, (24)
where f|hab|2(x) is the probability density function (pdf) of the random variable |hab|
2. Moreover,
γ is the Euler-Mascheroni constant with value γ ' 0.577216. Similar to E{ln (|hab|2)}, the
expectation of ln
(|hje|2) can be calculated, and, according to initial assumptions E{|hje|2} =
E
{|hae|2} = 1. Finally, the lower bound of the objective function can be rewritten as:
Rlb (ρ) =
1
ln 2
{
ln
(
1 +
ρPte
−γ
dαabσ
2
b
)
− ln (σ2e + (1− ρ)Ptd−αje + ρPtd−αae ) (25)
+ ln
(
σ2e + (1− ρ)Ptd−αje e−γ
)}
Hence, we reformulate the optimization problem (4) as follows:
max
ρ
Rlb (ρ) (26)
s.t. 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1,
Note that the objective function is non-concave. As a result, the problem is non-convex. In order
to solve this problem, we employ the Successive Convex Approximation (SCA) method, which
converts the optimization problem to a convex one. In particular, (25) has the difference of
two concave functions, and thus we adopt the difference of concave functions (DC) method to
approximate it as a concave function. To this end, we rewrite (25) as
Ξ (ρ) = = (ρ)− Φ (ρ) , (27)
where 
= (ρ) = 1
ln 2
{
ln
(
ρPte
−γ + dαabσ
2
b
)
+
ln
(
σ2e + (1− ρ)Ptd−αje e−γ
)− ln (dαabσ2b)} .
Φ (ρ) =
1
ln 2
ln
(
σ2e + (1− ρ)Ptd−αje + ρPtd−αae
)
.
(28)
By employing a linear approximation, Φ (ρ) can be rewritten as
Φ (ρ) ' Φ˜ (ρ) = Φ (ρ (s− 1)) +∇TΦ (ρ (s− 1)) (ρ− ρ(s− 1)) ,
July 17, 2019 DRAFT
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Algorithm 1 ITERATIVE POWER ALLOCATION ALGORITHM
1: Initialization: Set s = 0 (s is the iteration number) and initialize to ρ(0).
2: Set ρ = ρ(s)
3: Solve (30) and set the result to ρ(s+ 1)
4: If |ρ (s+ 1)− ρ (s)| ≤ ω
stop,
else
set s = s+ 1 and go back to step 2
where ∇ is the gradient operator. Therefore, we have
∇Φ (ρ (s− 1)) = 1
ln(2)
×
[
−Ptd−αje + Ptd−αae
σ2e + (1− ρ)Ptd−αje + ρPtd−αae
]
. (29)
Finally, after utilization of the DC approximation, (26) can be approximated to a convex opti-
mization problem as follows
max
ρ,
= (ρ)− Φ˜ (ρ) (30)
s.t. 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1,
For the solution of this convex optimization problem (30) , we can use available software such as
the CVX solver [28]. The iterative algorithm employed is shown as Algorithm I. This algorithm
is stopped when |ρ (s+ 1)− ρ (s)| ≤ ω is satisfied, where ω is the stopping threshold.
B. The Covert Communication Case
By substituting (17) into (14) and (15), and since ϑ∗ ≥ σ2e is always true, we can rewrite (18)
as follows:
max
ρ
Pψ1E
{
log2
(
1 +
ρPt|hab|2
dαabσ
2
b
)}
, (31a)
s.t. (4b)
ln
(
(1− ρ)Ptd−αje
ρPtd−αae
)
(1− ρ)Ptd−αje
ρPtd−αae − (1− ρ)Ptd−αje
≤ ln (ε) . (31b)
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Similar to Section V-A, the lower bound of (31a) can be calculated. By utilizing an auxiliary
variable t, the optimization problem (31) is equivalent to the following problem
max
ρ
Pψ1 log2
(
1 +
ρPte
−γ
dαabσ
2
b
)
, (32a)
s.t. (4b)
(1− ρ)Ptd−αje ln
(
(1− ρ)Ptd−αje
ρPtd−αae
)
− t ln (ε) ≤ 0 (32b)
ρPtd
−α
ae − (1− ρ)Ptd−αje ≤ t (32c)
The optimization problem (32) is convex; hence, for solving (32), we can use available software
such as the CVX solver [28].
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to evaluate the performance in the proposed
information-theoretic security and covert communication scenarios. The considered simulation
setting is listed in Table I.
Furthermore, we summarize the considered assumptions and applications for covert com-
munication and information-theoretic security methods in Table II. As seen in this table, in
information-theoretic security there is two cases 1) When the legitimate nodes transmit a jamming
signal which leads to an increase in the secrecy rate, 2) when Eve transmits a jamming signal
which leads to a decrease in the secrecy rate [29]. In covert communication, whether Eve or
legitimate nodes transmit the jamming signal, the covert rate increases because the message is
hidden in the jamming signal [8].
TABLE I: Simulation setting
djb Distance between jammer and bob 5 m
α Path-loss exponent 4
Pψ1 Probability of data transmission by Alice 0.5
1−ε Lower bound of detection error probability at Eve
0.9, 0.99,
and 0.999
σ2b Received noise power at Bob −30 dBW
σ2e Received noise power at Eve −30 dBW
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TABLE II: Assumption and applications of covert communication and information-theoretic security
Items Covert communication Information-theoretic security
Assumptions The code-book is unknown at Eve The code-book is known at Eve
Applications
To prevent detection of communi-
cation
To prevent extraction of private informa-
tion
Existence of legitimate jam-
mer
Covert rate increase Secrecy rate increase
Existence of Eve jammer Covert rate increase Secrecy rate decrease
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P t=1.5 watts, Exhaustive search
P t=1.5 watts, SCA method
P t=0.5 watts, Exhaustive search
P t=0.5 watts, SCA method
Fig. 2: Ergodic secrecy rate vs dab and evaluation of the impact of the total transmit power, dae = 5 m(meter),
dje = 5 m.
Fig. 2 shows the ergodic secrecy rate versus the distance between Alice and Bob. Moreover,
this figure compares the proposed solutions in the information-theoretic security scenario with
optimal values which are obtained from the exhaustive search method. To study the tightness
of the proposed lower bound on the secrecy rate, we directly solve the original optimization
problem (4) by the exhaustive search method. The proposed solution by SCA has about an
11.8% performance gap with that from the exhaustive search.
Fig. 3 shows the ergodic covert rate versus the distance from Alice to Bob. Moreover, this
figure illustrates the impact of different values of the total transmit power on the ergodic covert
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Fig. 3: Ergodic covert rate vs dab and evaluation of the impact of the total transmit power, ε = 0.1, dae = 5 m,
dje = 5 m.
rate. As seen, the ergodic covert rate is an increasing function with respect to the total transmit
power. The reason is that the emitted jamming signal only affects the received signal at Eve and
has no effect on Bob because he is able to cancel the jamming signal. Moreover, the proposed
solution has approximately a 23.7% performance gap with that obtained from the exhaustive
search. A comparison between exhaustive search in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 shows when Bob is
near to Alice, the information-theoretic security scheme has higher rate than that of the covert
communication scheme, but, when Bob is farther from Alice, the covert communication method
has higher rate compared to the information-theoretic security method. This is at first surprising
given the seemingly higher security requirement of covert communications. But recall that Alice
and Bob share a secret codebook in the covert communications scenario, yielding a potential
advantage. Mathematically, the reason it happens is that the covert communication requirement
(31b) and dab are independent, and the sensitivity of (31a) to dab is greater than the sensitivity
of (4) to dab because of the difference in the two achievable data rates. In information-theoretic
secrecy, when Bob gets further away from Alice the achievable rate of the Alice-to-Bob channel
approaches the achievable rate of the Alice-to-Eve channel which leads to zero secrecy rate,
while in the covert communication case the covert rate at high values of dab (7− 10 m) is non-
July 17, 2019 DRAFT
16
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
d
ab [m]
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
Er
go
di
c 
Co
ve
rt 
Ra
te
 [b
ps
/H
Z]
1-ǫ=0.9
1-ǫ=0.99
1-ǫ=0.999
Fig. 4: Ergodic covert rate vs dab and evaluation of the impact of the lower bound of detection error probability at
Eve on covert rate, i.e., 1− ε, Pt = 1.5 Watts, dae = 5 m, dje = 5 m.
zero.
Fig. 4 depicts the covert rate versus dab and evaluates the impact of the lower bound of
detection error probability at Eve on the covert rate. As expected, increasing the lower bound of
the detection error probability decreases the covert rate. As shown, if we aim to guarantee at least
99% and 99.9% detection error probability at Eve instead of 90%, the covert rate decreases 1.16
and 1.76 times, respectively. By increasing the lower bound of the detection error probability,
Alice should decrease the data transmit power and the jammer should increase the jamming
transmit power so that the covert communication requirement is satisfied. It is worth noting that
if we aim to guarantee very high detection error probability at Eve i.e., 99.9%, the covert rate
is quite limited.
In Fig. 5, the covert rate versus the distance between the jammer and Eve is depicted. The
distance between Alice and Eve is a parameter that is varied across curves. As seen, the impact
of the distance between Alice and Eve on the covert rate is more than that of the distance
between the jammer and Eve. In Fig. 6, the ergodic secrecy rate versus the distance between
the jammer and Eve is shown. Furthermore, in this figure, we study the impact of the distance
between Alice and Eve on the secrecy rate. This figure shows that the impact of distance of
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Fig. 5: Ergodic covert rate vs dje and evaluation of the impact of dae on covert rate, ε = 0.1, Pt = 1.5 Watts,
dab = 5 m.
between Alice and Eve on secrecy rate is more than that of the distance between the jammer
and Eve.
Finally, a comparison between Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 shows the sensitivity of information-theoretic
security with respect to the location of Eve is more than that of covert communication.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper investigated information-theoretic security and covert communication for a 4-node
wiretap channel. In order to make a comprehensive study, we investigated the power allocation
problems for both methods. In this paper, we considered a practical assumption i.e., we assumed
only CDI of channels are available for each of the secrecy and the covert communications
scenario. Under a similar but not identical mathematical formulation, we formulated the opti-
mization problems to maximize secrecy/covert rate subject to a transmit power constraint for
both methods and a covert communication requirement for the covert communication method.
Due to the non-convexity of the information-theoretic security optimization problem, we adopted
the SCA method to solve the problem. For the covert communication optimization problem, we
introduced an auxiliary variable to convert this non-convex optimization problem to a convex
one. Numerical results revealed that when Bob is near to Alice, the information theoretic security
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Fig. 6: Ergodic secrecy rate vs dje and evaluation of the impact of dae on covert rate, Pt = 1.5 Watts, dab = 5 m.
scheme has more rate than that of the covert communication scheme but, perhaps surprisingly,
this result is reversed when Bob is far from Alice. Moreover, we showed the sensitivity of
information-theoretic security with respect to the location of Eve is more than that of covert
communication. In order to study the optimality gap, the performance of the proposed solution
was compared with that obtained from the exhaustive method. The simulation results revealed
that the optimality gap between the proposed solution method and the exhaustive search method
is small.
APPENDIX B
Since Eve aims to minimize PFA + PMD, she does not select ϑ such that ϑ < σ2w, as
this would lead to PFA + PMD = 1. Hence, we can consider the summation of probability
of FA and MD ϑ > σ2w i.e., PFA + PMD = 1 + e
−(ϑ−σ2e)
(1−ρ)Ptd−αje + A
ρd−αae −(1−ρ)d−αje
. Accordingly,
to obtain ϑ∗, we set ∂(PFA+PMD)
∂ϑ
= 0, and by some mathematical manipulations, we find
ϑ∗ =
(
ρPtd
−α
ae (1−ρ)Ptd−αje
(1−ρ)Ptd−αje −ρPtd−αae
)
ln
(
(1−ρ)Ptd−αje
ρPtd
−α
ae
)
+ σ2e .
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